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Articles
A Container is Not a COGSA PackageWhen
the Bill of Lading Discloses the Contents
MARILYN C. HOVER*
The ocean bill of lading, although criticized as an anachronism that has
changed little in form since the nineteenth century,1 has become a docu-
ment that is significant for the purpose of determining the limitation of
carriers' liability to shippers2 for damages to cargo carried by ocean trans-
port. The liability of carriers is regulated by statute and has been limited
by the terms of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (hereinafter referred to
as COGSA).3 COGSA provides for a $500 limitation on liability for each
* B.A., 1974 Kirkland College; J.D. with Honors, 1979 Rutgers University Law
School at Newark, New Jersey; L.L.M., 1983 University of the Pacific, McGeorge School
of Law. Member of the California, District of Columbia, and New Jersey Bars. The author
thanks Stephen McCaffrey and A. Alan Kennedy for their assistance.
1. Crutcher, The Ocean Bill of Lading-A Study in Fossilization, 45 TUL. L. REV.
697,731 (1971); see also Bissell, The OperationalRealities of Containerization and Their Ef-
fect on the "Package" Limitation and the "On-Deck" Prohibition: Review and Suggestions,
45 TUL. L. REv. 902 (1971). Bissell suggests that the increase in the speed of transporting
goods, due to new methods of packaging, will diminish the need for bills of lading. Comput-
erized communication, whereby goods are cleared simultaneously through export and im-
port customs and through which banks' and merchants' accounts may be debited and
credited as part of the sameprocedure, may also contribute toward the eventual disappear-
ance of the bill of lading. Iae at 923-24.
2. The terms "shipper" and "carrier" are used in a general sense: "shipper" in-
cludes those who are identified in interest with the shipper, such as the shipper's insurer;
"carrier" includes those who are identified in interest with the carrier and the carrier's in-
surer.
3. Carriage of Goods By Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§1300-1315 (1976) [hereinafter re-
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"package," or if packages are not used, for each "customary freight unit"4
unless the shipper has stated on the bill of lading the nature and value of
the goods.5 Because Congress did not define the COGSA term "package,"
thejudicial determination of whether specific cargo is a package has been
complicated by changes in the methods of transport such as palletization
and containerization. 6 Courts have attempted to lend a measure of pre-
dictability to this determination by fashioning tests to discover whether
Congress or the parties "intended" certain cargo to be a package for limi-
tation of liability purposes.7 These attempts have produced various and
unsatisfactory results, however, and have led to demands for uniformity
through legislative action. 8
International conventions have recently decided that the number of
packages enumerated in the bill of lading determines the liability limita-
tion of cargo shipped in containers under international law when damages
are assessed for lost or damaged cargo.9 Judicial analysis under COGSA
has developed a simplified rule that also initially considers the expression
in the bill of lading. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has established
a conclusive presumption in favor of the shipper that a container is not a
COGSA packageif the contents of the container are disclosed in the bill of
lading, unless clear language evidences the parties' agreement on the defi-
ferred to as COGSA]. COGSA generally provides that the carrier owes the shipper the duty
to use due diligence in providing a seaworthy ship and in caring for the cargo. Id. at § 1303.
The carrier may avail itself of 17 defenses against liability under COGSA. Id. at
§ 1304(2)(a)-(2)(g).
4. Although the "customary freight unit" is undefined by COGSA, courts have
settled on its meaning as the "unit of quantity, weight or measure of the cargo customarily
used as the basis for the calculation of the freight rate to be charged." Brazil Oiticica, Ltd. v.
The Bill, 55 F. Supp. 780,783 (D.Md.), affd 145 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1944); see Bissell, supra
note 1; note 23 infra. Discussion of "unit" is beyond the scope of this article.
5. Section 1304(5) of COGSA provides in relevant part:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or
damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceed-
ing $500 per package lawful money of the United States or in case of goods not
shipped in packages, per customary freight unit... unless the nature and value of
such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the
bill of lading.
46 U.S.C. § 1304(5).
6. See, e.g., Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 507
(1974); see infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
7. Legislative intent, although sometimes difficult to pinpoint, provides guidance
for every determination of cargo liability under CO GSA, whereas the parties' intent, neces-
sarily complex in its reliance on subjectivity and particular facts, may not always be a fruit-
ful inquiry for .this purpose. The parties' intent, as evidenced by the bill of lading, should
have no effect on the COGSA determination. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am. v. S.S. Aegis
Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894,905 (W.D. Wash. 1976). See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying
text.
8. See, e.g., Bissell, supra note 1; Edelman, Cargo Claims and Limitation of Liabil-
ity, 17 FORUM 719 (1982); Sorkin, Changing Concepts of Liability, 17 FORUM 710 (1982);
Comment, Interpreting COGSA: The Meaning of "Package", 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 169
(1975); Comment,A Container Should Never Be a Package: Going Beyond Mitsui v. Ameri-
can Export Lines, Inc., 2 PACE L. REV. 309 (1982).
9. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
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nition of the COGSA package. 10
This article will review legislation and international agreements that
provide the framework for the limitation of carriers' liability for ocean-
transported cargo.1 In addition, the author will summarize the develop-
ment of thejudicial determination of "intent" as to whether cargo should
be within the statutory term "package," particularly as that term relates to
containerized cargo. 2 The article will evaluate the recent Second Circuit
decision, Smythgreyhound v. M1 V "Eurygenes,"13 which refined the judi-
cial analysis that looks first to the bill of lading to determine whether a
container is a COGSA package. 14 Finally, this article will suggest that the
Smythgreyhound decision elucidated a clear test to determine the COGSA
package.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The liability of carriers for damaged or lost cargo carried on ocean voy-
ages was first limited by the International Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, known as the Hague Rules,
adopted in 1924.15 The Hague Rules were designed to bring uniformity
and predictability to maritime commerce 16 and to protect the shipper
from the effects of exculpatory clauses inserted in the bill of lading by the
carrier who controlled the contract of carriage.17
To incorporate the Hague Rules, the United States enacted the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act in 1936.18 COGSA generally covers only for-
eign commerce and applies only to the time between the loading and
unloading of cargo, 19 but parties may stipulate that the provisions of the
10. Smythgreyhoundv. M/V"Eurygenes", 666 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981).
1 . See infra notes 15-55 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 56-98 and accompanying text.
13. 666 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981).
14. See infra notes 99-138 and accompanying text.
15. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills
of Lading (Hague Rules), Aug. 25, 1924,51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 (193 1-
32) [hereinafter referred to as Hague Rules]. The Hague Rules were formulated at the
Hague Convention in September, 1921, and adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on
Maritime Law in Brussels, August 25, 1924. The earlier Harter Act of 1893, which regulated
responsibility under ocean carriers' bills of lading, was silent as to package limitation
clauses. The Harter Act applies primarily to domestic carriage under bills of lading, up to
delivery at a fit and customary wharf and according to custom and usage of the port. 46
U.S.C. §§181-195 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Robert C. Herd& Co., Inc. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., et al, 359 U.S.
297,301 (1959).
17. See Calamari, The Container Revolution and the $500 Package Limitation - Con-
flictingApproaches and UnrealSolutions:A ProposedAlternative, 51 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 687
(1977); Sorkin, Changing Concepts of Liability, 17 FORUM 710 (1982). The exculpatory
clauses were often regarded from the shipper's point of view as a contract of adhesion. See,
e.g., Caterpillar Overseas, S.A.v. S.S. Expeditor, 318 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1963); Simon, Latest
Developments in the Law of Shipping Containers, 4 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 441 (1973).
18. Carriage of Goods By Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976).
19. 46U.S.C.§1311.
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Act apply domestically and to a period of time subsequent to unloading.20
The limitation of carriers' liability for damaged or lost cargo in section
1304(5) of COGSA provides that liability shall be limited to "$500 per
package.. . or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary
freight unit... unless the nature and value of such goods have been de-
clared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading."' 1
Therefore, if a declaration of value in the bill of lading by the shipper is ab-
sent, the limitation on liability will depend upon the definition of pack-
age. If the goods are not packaged, the limitation on liability will be
determined by the customary freight unit, which has come to mean the
unit of cargo used as the basis for the freight rate charged.22
The purpose of the COGSA package limitation was to promote uni-
formity and establish a minimum carriers' liability to protect shippers
from the disclaimers that were inserted in the bills of lading by carriers
who had control over the contract of carriage.23 Under COGSA, if the
shipper declares the nature and value of the goods before shipment by in-
serting a provision in the bill of lading, the limitation on liability is ren-
dered inoperative. The parties may agree to an amount higher than the
$500 limitation, but the carrier is not liable for more than the damages ac-
tually sustained.24
20. 46 U.S.C. § 1312. See generally, Recupero, The Shipper's Right to Recover Under
COGSA ForDamage to Containerized Cargo, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 51 (1973-74).
21. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) quoted in note 5 supra.
22. In Brazil Oiticia, Ltd. v. The Bill, 55 F. Supp. 780 (D. Md.) affd, 145 F.2d 470
(4th Cir. 1944), the customary freight unit was deemed to be the unit used as the basis for
the freight rate to be charged. In this case, where bulk oilleaked and had to be pumped over-
board to save cargo in the hold, the issue was whether the "freight" in the phrase "custom-
ary freight unit" referred to money or consideration to be paid to the carrier for the
transportation of the commodity or to the commidity itself. If deemed to be the "shipping
unit," as in England, the recovery would be minimal. If deemed to be the base on which re-
muneration for the carriage of the commodity was computed, the award would more
closely approximate actual damages. See Bissell, supra note 1; Interpreting COGSA, supra
note 8. Under this construction, the bill of lading provides guidance. Notably, the Hague
Rules, unlike COGSA, limit liability per "package or unit." The decisions regard package
and unit as similar categories, and not, as in the United States under COGSA, as exclusive
and alternative categories. Bissell, supra note 1.
23. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 491 F.2d 960,962 (9th
Cir. 1974) (citing Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1935: Hearings on S.1152 Before the Comm. on
Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15,47 (1935)); Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong
Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7,14-15 (2d Cir. 1969) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 2218,74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1936)); Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386,388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Lat-
est Developments, supra note 17. An additional purpose of the COGSA minimum liability
occasionally mentioned by the courts has been theprotection of the carrier from exorbitant
claims on items whose value is not ascertainable because their precise nature is hidden by
thepackage. SeeAluminios Pozuelo, Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator, 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1968); In-
ter-American Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated Caribbean Transport, Inc., 313 F. Sulp. 1334,
1336 (S.D. Fla. 1970). But see, Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am. v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F.
Supp. 894, 908 (carrier's argument that it had no knowledge of contents is meritless; it
could easily rectify the situation which is "arguably of [its] own making"); see infra notes
46-50 and accompanying text. Cf DeOrchis, The Container and the Package Limitation-
The Search For Predictability, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 251 (1974) (shipper should bear burden
to declare container as package or pay higher freight).
24. 46 U.S.C. §1304(5).
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The Hague Rules were amended in 1968, but these amendments have
not been ratified by the United States.' The amendments increased the li-
ability limitation from $500 to $622 per package, or to $.90 per pound,
whichever is higher. If containers were characterized as packages, the
weight limitation would almost always control because the container
probably would weigh more than the number of pounds necessary to ex-
ceed the $622 per package limitation. 6 The amendments address the issue
of defining a container as a package by providing that where a container,
pallet, or similar article of transport is used to consolidate goods, the
number of packages or units enumerated in the bill of lading as packed in
the article of transport shall be deemed to be the number of packages or
units for the purpose of the liability limitation.27 The shipper thus may
cause the container not to be considered the package by noting on the bill
of lading the number of packages stowed in the container.
In 1978, the Hamburg Rules were promulgated by the United Nations
Conference on Carriage of Goods by Sea. 8 If ratified by the United
States, the Hamburg Rules would alter the operation of COGSA. The
container itself, for example, would be subject to the risk of liability be-
cause the Hamburg Rules define goods as containers. 29 The liability limit
is about $1,000 per package or $3.00 per kilogram.30 The Hamburg Rules,
in a manner similar to that adopted by the amendments to the Hague
25. Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, August 25, 1968, also known as the Visby Amend-
ments, reprinted in the Hamburg Rules on The Carriage of Goods By Sea 302 (S.
Mankabady ed. 1978). See DeGurse, The "Container Clause"in Article 4(5) of the 1968 Pro-
tocol to the Hague Rules, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 131 (1970). The United States delegation
which participated substantially in the drafting of the amendment could not support limits
of liability that might place palletized and containerized cargo in a less favorable position
than that attributed to cargo prior to containerization. The recommendation of the delega-
tion that a container never be considered a package for the purpose of limiting liability was
not accepted. Id
26. Low weight, high value cargo would most likely be transported by air. DeGurse,
supra note 25, at 138 n.28.
27. Article 2(c) of the amendments provides that:
Where a container, pallet, or similar article of transport is used to consolidate
goods, the number of packages or units enumerated in the Bill of Lading as packed
in such article shall be deemed the number of packages or units concerned. Except
as aforesaid, such article of transport shall be considered the package or unit.
See DeGurse, supra note 5, at 138 n.28 (commentary on the potential application of the
"container clause," and the argument that the carrier is without authority to increase uni-
laterally the freight rate solely because the shipper enumerated the number of packages or
units in the bill of lading, even though an increased liability may be assumed thereby); see
also Schmeltzer and Peavy, Prospects andProblems of the ContainerRevolution, 1 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 203 (1970).
28. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg
Rules), Mar. 30, 1978, A/CONF.89/13, .... _U.N.T.S. _, U.N. Doc. 1978 [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Hamburg Rules].
29. Id, article 1(5). Compare various descriptions of the container as a part of the
ship, in Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), quoting, Simon, The Law
of Shipping Containers, supra note 6, at 513; Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc., et al v.
Caputo, 432 U.S. 249,271 (1977) (container is modern substitute for hold of avessel).
30. Hamburg Rules, article 6(l)(a).
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Rules, allow the parties to determine when a container is a package by
providing that unless the bill of lading indicates that the individual pack-
ages are considered to be separate packages for limitation purposes, the
container will constitute the package."
The Hamburg Rules served as a model for the provisions contained in
the recently adopted Convention of International Multimodal Transport
of Goods.32 Article 18(2) of the Multimodal Convention increased the lia-
bility limits of the Hamburg Rules by 10% to account for inflation, and
adopted the attempted resolution of the container-as-package issue in the
Hamburg Rules by looking to the bill of lading. Enumeration in the bill of
lading of the number of shippers' packages consolidated in one container
will preclude treatment of the container as a package.33
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BILL OF LADING UNDER COGSA
The bill of lading34 has become the document that a court will examine
to determine the application of the COGSA package limitation to a car-
rier's liability for damages to cargo consolidated in a container, pallet, or
similar article of transport. One issue that has arisen with respect to the
bill of lading is whether the parties' expression in the bill of lading controls
even when COGSA does not apply directly, exproprio vigore.35 COGSA
applies ex proprio vigore only to foreign trade to or from United States
ports,36 and to damages sustained between and including the loading and
31. Id., article 6(2)(a).
32. United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods,
U.N. Doc. TD/MT/CONF/ 16 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Multimodal Convention],
adopted by the United Nations in May, 1980, reprinted and discussed in Driscoll and Lar-
sen, The International Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, 57 TUL.
L. REV. 193 (1982).
33. Driscoll and Larsen, supra note 32, at 263. Article 18(2)(a) of the Multimodal
Convention provides as follows:
Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to consolidate
goods, the package or other shipping units enumerated in the multimodal transport
document as packed in such article of transport are deemed packages or shipping
units. Except as aforesaid the goods in such article of transport are deemed one
shipping unit.
Assurance of liability limits is established by allowing national law to be effective only if
limits are higher. Thus, if loss or damage "can be localized as having occurred during a mo-
dal state of the multinational transportation, then any higher modal convention or national
law limits will apply." Driscoll and Larsen, supra note 32, at 238. Thus, there is a floor to the
application of the modal limits. Id. _
34. A bill of lading is the contract between the shipper and the carrier which defines
the rights, duties, exemptions, and limitations of the parties, whether imposed by statute or
the result of voluntary agreement. Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (footnote omitted).
35. Exproprio vigore is defined as "by its own force." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
522 (5th ed. 1979).
36. 46 U.S.C. § 1300 provides that: "Every bill of lading or similar document of title
which is evidence of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the
United States, in foreign trade, shall have effect subject to the provisions of this chapter."
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unloading of cargo, excluding on-deck cargo.37 The shipper and the car-
rier are free, however, to extend the applicability of COGSA to situations
not otherwise covered, by incorporating COGSA by reference in the bill
of lading.38 When COGSA is not applicable exproprio vigore, and the par-
ties choose to incorporate COGSA by reference, they may define the term
"package" to affect the carrier's liability even if the result of that defini-
tion is contrary to the minimum liability provision of COGSA.39 An ex-
plicit definition, however, should be examined for clarity of expression,
especially if that definition as incorporated in the bill of lading confers vir-
tual immunity upon the carrier by altering the statutory rule.' When the
parties' definition is unclear, a court may examine the facts and rely upon
prior case law construing the appropriate limitation of liability in similar
cases. Additionally, the COGSA purpose of protecting the shipper
37. Id; see 46 U.S.C. § 130 1(c) (definition of "goods"). Cases in which COGSA has
applied exproprio vigore have relied on the bill of lading as an expression of intent, thereby
linmitingliability according to the conclusion that an article was "intended" to be apackage.
The court in Gulf Italia Co. v. S.S. Exira, 160 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), affdsub nom.,
Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1959), relied on the
description in the bill of lading of the tractor cargo as "semi boxed" in finding that it was
not a package. 263 F.2d at 136-37. In Aluminios Pozuelo Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator, 407 F.2d
152 (2d Cir. 1968), the court used the bill of lading to support its holding that a press bolted
onto a skid was a package, although admittedly a "Brobdingnagian one." Id at 156. The
bill of lading recited "One" under the column designated "No. of Pkgs." The specification
of "one package" was deemed a word of art, the liability consequences of which the parties
were presumed to have understood. ld at 156. In Nichimen Co. v. M/V McFarland, 462
F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1972), the court held that rolled steel coils strapped and tied with steel
bands were packages, a conclusion supported in part by the parties' understanding as re-
vealed in the sales contract and the bill of lading. Id at 334-35. A New York state court de-
cision, Primary Industries Corp. v. Barber Lines, 357 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1974),
based its finding that bundles of ingots were packages on a selective reading of the bill of
lading which recited the number of ingots as well as the number of bundles.
38. 46U.S.C.§1312.
39. In cases where COGSA applied indirectly because of its incorporation by the
parties, the definition of package has been upheld unless found to be unclear and ambigu-
ous. See cases and discussion at Edelman, supra note 8, at 722-24. According to Pannell v.
United States Lines Co., 263 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959), the par-
ties were free to stipulate in the bill of lading whether the cargo was a package, if COGSA
applied indirectly and was incorporated by reference, but the court noted that this stipula-
tion would not be allowed if COGSA applied exproprio vigore. 263 F.2d at 498. As stated in
Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc. v. S.S. Puerto Rico, 607 F.2d 322,325 (4th Cir. 1979),
Pannell held that "when COGSA does not apply exproprio vigore, effect should be given to
the parties' definition of package even if that definition is contrary to that which would con-
trol if COGSA were directly applicable." See also Croft & Scully Co. v. M/V Skulptor
Vuchetich, 508 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (consideration of intent was appropriate
where COGSA incorporated by reference); Van Breem v. International Terminal Operat-
ing Co., (1974) 1 Lloyd's List L.RI 599. Cf. cases cited infra note 40.
40. See Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Co., 359 U.S. 297,305 (1959) (con-
tracts granting carriers immunity from liability should be strictly construed and not ap-
plied to alter familiar rules of liability for negligence, unless the language used in the
contract clearly expresses a grant of immunity understood by the contracting parties), cited
in Hanover Insurance Co. v. Shulman Transport Enterprises, Inc., 581 F.2d 268, 273-74(1st Cir. 1978) (COGSA incorported by reference did not mean liability per statute could
be reduced); David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 339 F.2d 295, 298-99 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 976 (1965) (where COGSA voids alimitation of liability provi-
sion, it remains void even where time period is not strictly covered by COGSA); Watermill
Export, Inc. v. M/V"Ponce", 506 F. Supp. 612,614 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (contract term is void
if void under COGSA even when incorporated by reference; Pannell distinguished as in-
volving an incorporation of only apart of COGSA).
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through provision of a minimum liability"1 should also be considered.
Allowing the definition in the bill of lading to be the test of whether cer-
tain cargo should be deemed to be a package permits the possibility of a
lower liability than statutorily mandated. When the parties have unwit-
tingly made certain notations on the bill of lading and have relied on the
disclosures in the bill, courts have focused on the notations in determining
whether the cargo is a package when the definition is unclear.42 The car-
rier has an advantage over the shipper in preparing the bill of lading be-
cause the carrier chooses the headings and is responsible for printing the
form that the shipper must fill out. 3 The carrier will be able to know the
contents of the cargo, however, because the bill can be drafted to require
that information.'
Even if the bill of lading discloses the nature of the cargo, the carrier is
not bound by quality or value representations on the bill of lading when
the statements cannot be verified. Under section 1303(3)(b) of COGSA, a
carrier must furnish the shipper with a bill of lading identifying, inter alia,
the number of packages or pieces or their quantity or weight when the
shipper has demanded the bill. The carrier, however, need not present
these items on the bill if the carrier reasonably suspects their inaccuracy or
has no reasonable means of checking."5 Section 101 of the Pomerene Bills
of Lading Act' relieves a carrier from responsibility for the accuracy of
the bill of lading details supplied by the shipper concerning package or
bulk freight loaded by the shipper. This Act applies to both interstate and
state-to-foreign-country commerce. Under section 100 of the Act, the car-
rier is obligated to ascertain the details of the cargo that is loaded, and
clauses disclaiming this obligation are invalidated.
In practice, carriers either refrain from issuing detailed bills of lading or
qualify the bills by the notation "said to contain" (s.t.c.) or "shipper's load
41. The court in Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir.
1971) invalidated a bill of lading provision that limited carriers' liability to $500 with re-
spect to the contents of each container, although it relied upon the indication of the bill of
lading that the container held 99 bales of leather to support its holding that each bale was a
package. Id at 804. The outcome of Leather's Best and Pannell appear inconsistent. See In-
terpreting COGSA, supra note 8. The distinction is made clear by the reasoning in Smyth-
greyhound v. M/V"Eurygenes", 666 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981), in which the court refused to
let the parties' attempted definition control when COGSA was incorporated by reference if
it was not clear and unambiguous. Therein, the parties' definition was not clear, since the
bill of lading referred to both cartons and containers. Id. at 751. Similarly, the bill of lading
in Leather's Best referenced both bales and containers.
42. See supra note 37.
43. See Interpreting COGSA, supra note 8, at 187-88.
44. See Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, supra note 6.
45. Since the carrier will not give a bill of lading with numbers it cannot verify, ship-
pers may refrain from indicating on the bill of lading the number of units of cargo in the
container. See Comment, A Container Should Never Be a Package: Going Beyond Mitsui v.
American Export Lines, Inc., 2 PACE L. REv. 309,322 n.95 (1982).
46. 49 U.S.C. §81etseq.
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and count."'47 When the shipper stows and seals the container before de-
livery to the carrier, the shipper loses the benefit of any bill of lading pre-
sumptions about the condition of the goods. The shipper then is left with
little protection against the carrier's liability for damage to the goods. In
addition, the shipper has the burden of proving that the number of items
delivered is the same as the number originally claimed.48 If the carrier re-
fuses to verify the bill of lading as completed by the shipper, either as a
matter of cautionary practice or because the carrier cannot verify the con-
tents as loaded and sealed by the shipper, the reliance on the bill of lading
disclosure may produce nominal carrier liability.
Decisions that rely on the enumeration of goods in the bill of lading as
an indication of whether the cargo should be deemed a package under
COGSA have considered the disclosure to be an expression of intent of
the parties.49 If the carrier has been unable to verify the contents'of the
cargo, however, the numbered items disclosed on the bill of lading are not
an accurate expression of the carrier's intent. Some decisions have recog-
nized the problem of relying on the bill of lading if the carrier did not have
the opportunity to verify the enumerations and disclosures.50 These
courts have based their decisions on the carrier's actual knowledge of the
cargo contents. The courts in these cases did not mention the problem of
proving knowledge of the effect on actual value limitations that were
caused by the statutory provisions referring to nonverifiable bills of lad-
ing under which the carrier is not bound.5
An enumeration of the contents of a cargo in the bill of lading should
not permit the carrier to charge increased freight rates.5" The carrier will
47. Simon, More on the Law of Shipping Containers, 6 J. MAIR L. & COM. 603,609-
10 (1975); seesupra note 45; infra note 51.
48. See supra note 47.
49. See supra notes 40-42.
50. See duPont de Nemours International S.A. v. S.S. Mormaevega, 367 F. Supp.
793 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1972) (no real dispute as to honesty of shipper's
declaration of number of packages in container, although aproblem might occur when the
shipper filled in the bill of lading on land where the carrier could not verify it, and recovery
was on the basis of an "s.t.c." notation); Inter-American Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated Carib-
bean Transport Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1334,1336-37 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (court recognized the pur-
pose of minimum liability was also to protect carrier from claims by shipper for damages to
contents of package prepared by shipper when nature and value of contents were not de-
clared in bill of lading but here the carrier knew the contents); Schacher, The ContainerBill
of Lading as a Receipt, 10 J. MAR. L. & COM. 39 (1978) (discussion of why the issue has not
been raised-perhaps due to insurance litigating tactics). In the Multimodal Convention,
supra note 32, the multimodal transport document is required to contain certain particu-
lars, including the number of packages or pieces, as furnished by the consignor. Id article
8.1(2). If the multimodal transport operator knows or suspects that the representation is in-
accurate, he must insert on the document his reservation specifying the inaccuracies,
grounds of suspicion or the absence of reasonable means of checking, and if he fails to note
the apparent condition of the goods on the document, the goods are deemed to have been in
good condition. Id article 9.
51. See supra note50.
52. See supra note 27; see also Note, Carrier-Owned Shipping Container Found Not
to be COGSA "Package", 56 TUL. L. REv. 1409 (1982). Carrier insurance is based on ton-
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want to know the nature of the goods because the freight rate may be
based on the value or the tonnage of the goods, or both. The shipper's sim-
ple disclosure of the cargo contents on the bill of lading, however, is not
necessarily a declaration of value sufficient to justify a freight increase.
Furthermore, the disclosure is insufficient to qualify as a statement of
value under section 1304(5) of COGSA, which would exclude the cargo
from the limitation as to package or customary freight unit. The risk of
cargo damage ultimately is borne by the insurers, and whether the carrier
or the shipper should bear the cost of that risk is a continuing contro-
versy. 3 Any resolution must consider that the nature of the liability im-
posed upon the carrier should induce him to undertake precautions, the
cost of which would be economically justified by the reduction of the risk
of loss or damage to the goods.54 This resolution assumes that the twin
goals of the cargo loss and damage rules are to minimize higher shipping
or product costs and to encourage safe transport.55
LEGISLATIVE AND CONTRACTUAL INTENT
Courts and commentators have analyzed "intent" in two contexts relat-
ing to whether a container is a package under section 1304(5) of COGSA:
(1) whether the word package in the statute was intended by Congress to
be construed as a "word of art" or pursuant to its "plain meaning," and (2)
whether the shipper and the carrier intended the item of cargo to be a
COGSA package in each specific case. In the following section, this article
will summarize case law construing the legislative intent behind the term
"package" in COGSA. The factors that courts have used to determine the
parties' intent in defining "package" include the expression in the con-
tract of carriage and the bill of lading.
The absence of a specific definition of "package" in COGSA has led to
differing interpretations about the appropriate meaning of the word.56
nage not value so no increase in freight rate isjustified by enumerating the contents of the
container on the bill of lading. Id at 1420.
53. See, e.g., DeOrchis, supra note 23, asserting that the shipper should bear burden
of higher freight rate or declaring container as package since cargo insurance purchased by
shipper is cheaper than the Privilege and Indemnity (P & I) insurance purchased by the car-
rier. Cf. Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, supra note 6; Simon, More on the Law of
Shipping Containers, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 603 (1975).
54. Diplock, Conventions and Morals -Limitation Clauses in International Maritime
Conventions, I J. MAR. L. & COM. 525,527 (1970); see also Mitsui v. American Export Line,
Inc., 636 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1981).
55. Accord Sorkin, Changing Concepts of Liability, 17 FORUM 710, 717-18 (1982)
(suggests an international convention on insurance); infra note 65.
56. An early case under the English Carrier's Act which limited liability for articles
contained in any "parcel or package" considered a wagon with sides and no top, transport-
ing a group of oil paintings, to be a package. Whaite v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co.,
L.R. 9 Ex. 467 (1875) (effectuating a purpose to protect carriers from exorbitant claims on
items which are hidden by the package).
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Thejudicial search for an interpretation of the term "package" within the
policies underlying the enactment of COGSA has been affected by the
changes in shipping transport methods, from break-bulk57 to palletiza-
tion58 and containerization. 9 In earlier cases, a "common-sense stan-
dard"6 was applied, but that standard recently has been deemed
"outmoded and utterly meaningless."'" Acknowledging that the trans-
portation system had changed greatly since the enactment of COGSA, a
Fifth Circuit decision stated that because technology has created a mari-
time transportation system that was not in existence in 1936 when Con-
gress enacted COGSA, the task of the court was to interpret a subject that
neither Congress nor the courts had ever considered.62
A "plain meaning" definition of the term was given by the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Pacific Far East
Line, Inc.63 The court held that an electrical transformer, movable by
57. "Break-bulk" refers to the handling of loose packages separately or in very
small numbers by means of handcarts held upright and pushed by stevedores. Simon, The
Law of Shipping Containers, supra note 6, at 510-11. The term is used to refer to traditional
non-containerized cargo. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am. v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp.
894,900 n.14 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
58. "Palletization" is "a method of stowing general cargo of a very homogenous na-
ture on rectangular wooden cargo trays designed to be transported by means of a fork lift
truck. The consolidation of cargo on pallets serves to reduce labor costs, to protect the
cargo and to facilitate loading and discharging from the vessel." Bissell, supra note 1, at 907.
59. "Containerization" refers to the method of storing cargo in large articles of
transport easily loaded and emptied. Various definitions cover a myriad of shapes and
sizes. See Angus, Legal Implications of "The Container Revolution" in International Car-
riage of Goods, 14 MCGILL L.J. 395, 398-99 (1968). Summarizing the definition of a
container from that adopted by the International Safe Container Convention and the Cus-
toms Convention on Containers in 1972, one authority on the subject has stated that:
A container is a permanent reusable article of transport equipment-not packaging
of goods-durably made of metal, and equipped with doors for easy access to the
goods and for repeated use. It is designed to facilitate the handling, loading, stow-
age aboard ship, carriage, discharge from ship, movement, and transfer of large
numbers of packages simultaneously by mechanical means to minimize the costs
and risks of manually processing each packageindividually.
Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, supra note 6, at 513. The advantages of container-
ization over break-bulk transport include the reduction in (1) time and effort needed to
handle cargo; (2) possible theft and damage; (3) time and effort required to move from
point of origin to final destination; and (4) the ship's turnaround time in port. The use of
containers has permitted economies of scale to be introduced to in-port operations, al-
lowing more round trips per year, and ultimately reducing the fixed cost allocated per voy-
age. Tombari, Trends in Oceanborne Containerization and its Implicationsfor the U.S. Liner
Industry, 10 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 311, 311-12 (1979); Schmeltzer and Peavy, Prospects and
Problems of the Container Revolution, 1 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 203 (1970). Seesupra note 29.
60. Standard Electrica, SA. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-Ge-
sellschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).
61. Aluminos Pozuelo Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator, 407 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1968) (pal-
letized 3-ton toggle press held to be a package). The meaning of "package" which has
evolved from the cases can... be said to define a class of cargo irrespective of size, shape or
weight, to which some packaging for transport has been made which facilitates handling
butwhich does notnecessarily conceal or completely enclose thegoods. Id at 155. The term
"package" is a shipping term; thelayman's conception of the work is insignificant. Mitsub-
ishi Int'l Corp. v. S.S. Palmetto State, 311 F.2d 382,383 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
922 (1963) (fully boxed roll of steel was a package regardless of size and weight of 32 tons).
62. Wirth Ltd. v. S.S. Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir.) (footnote ormt-
ted), reh'gdenied, 541 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1976).
63. 491 F.2d 960 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); see Armstrong, Pack-
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built-in lifting lungs and attached by bolts to a wooden skid but not other-
wise boxed or crated, was not shipped in a package within the meaning of
COGSA. In making this determination, the court stated that because no
specialized or technical meaning was ascribed to the word "package," pre-
sumably Congress had no specific definition in mind and intended that
the word be given its plain, ordinary meaning. Further support for the
plain meaning definition of the term was gleaned from the "undoubted
objective" of the limitation on liability provision that sought to establish a
minimum amount of liability below which carriers could not reduce liabil-
ity for cargo damage.'
The courts had difficulty classifying pallets or containers as packages
even when using the plain meaning of the word. A pallet or container, al-
though conceivably serving a function of enclosure similar to that of a
package from a layman's point of view, could not be considered a readily
movable object nor deemed a COGSA package because the resulting lia-
bility would undercut the statutory minimum.65
An early test used to define a COGSA package looked to whether the
packaging facilitated handling of the item during transport. In Middle
East Agency v. The John B. Waterman,66 parts of a rock crusher were
bolted to wooden skids but were not otherwise packaged for shipment.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
ruled that a large piece of machinery shipped on a skid was a package for
limitation of liability purposes, rejecting plaintiff's argument that the cus-
tomary freight unit should apply to uncrated pieces of machinery. A later
case, Gulf Italia Co. v. The Exiria,67 modified the analysis used in Middle
EastAgency, viewing the facilitating transport test as only one factor to be
used in determining a COGSA package. In Gulf Italia, a tractor partially
covered by waterproof papering and a wooden sheathing, but not at-
aging Trends andImplications in the Container Revolution, 12 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 427,430-
31(1981).
64. See 46 U.S.C. §1304(5). The United States District Court in Matsushita Elec.
Corp. of Am. . S.S. Aegis Spirit, stated that "if carriers alone, or even carriers and shippers
together, are allowed to christen something 'package' which distorts or belies the plain
meaning of this word as used in the statute, then the liability floor becomes illusory and ne-gotiable." 414 F. Supp. at 905. The United States District Court in Omark Industries, Inc.
v. Associated Container Trans., Ltd. 420 F. Supp. 139(D. Oregon 1976) held thatpalletized
units, rather than the inner cartons that formed the constituents of each palletized unit,
constituted the "package." ld at 142. One court described the $500 limitation as a "mere
pittance." Gulf Italia Co. v. S.S. Exira, 160 F. Supp. 959. See supra notes 37 and 42 and ac-
companying text. Such a characterization, however, should not detract from the practical-
ity of the issue, which is concerned with allocating the cost of the risk, i.e., insurance.
Diplock, supra note 54. See generally Bannister, Containerization and Marine Insurance, 5 J.
MAR. L. & CoM. 463 (1974); McDowell, Containerization: Comments on Insurance andLia-
bility, 3 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 503 (1972).
65. Seesupranote41.
66. 86 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); see supra note 37.
67. 160 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), afJ'd sub nom., Gulf Italia Co. v. American
Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1959); see supra note 37.
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tached to a skid, was heldnot to be a package. Liability was therefore com-
puted according to customary freight unit. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York noted that the wooden shell in this case
was present for protective purposes whereas the skid in Middle East
Agency was attached to facilitate transport.68 The court stated, however,
that this distinguishing factor was insufficient to support the holding of
the case at bar. The court considered two additional factors: the protec-
tion of carriers from exorbitant claims on items that are hidden by pack-
aging, and the ownership and preparation of the container. The court
concluded by holding that the preparation of an item for shipment, stand-
ing alone, should not make the item a package within the meaning of
COGSA. To adopt such a construction would place a shipper who at-
tempts to minimize possible harm to his property in a worse position than
a shipper who makes no effort to reduce the possibility of loss.
The analyses applied by the courts to determine whether a container or
pallet is a package have not been consistent. In United Purveyors, Inc. v.
Motor VesselNew Yorker,69 the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, without discussion, limited recovery to $500 for damaged cases
of frozen fish shipped in a van, impliedly holding that the van was either
the package or the customary freight unit for limitation purposes.7" In a
later case, Inter-American Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated Caribbean Transport,
Inc.,71 the same court held that the limitation on liability applied to the
cartons stowed within the container rather than to the container itself,
even though the bill of lading referred to one trailer. 2 The distinguishing
factor in this case was the receipt of the cartons by the carrier's agent. In
United Purveyors, the shipper had not loaded and sealed the carrier-sup-
plied containers.73 In dictum, the court in Inter-American Foods stated
that the cartons, rather than the container, would be considered to be the
package even if the shipper had delivered a sealed container to the car-
rier.74 Interestingly, no mention of the cartons was made in the shipping
documents.
The various tests that were being used by federal courts to classify con-
68. 160 F. Supp. at 959. The facilitation of transport test looked to the functional
transportation ability of the item, and in so doing, relied on the traditional notion of a pack-
age as an enclosing type of structure. See supra note 61; Interpreting COGSA, supra note 8.
69. 250 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
70. lId at 106.
71. 313 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
72. Id at 1339.
73. id
74. Id A recent Fifth Circuit decision pronounced that the container is not the
package where the bill of lading disclosed the contents of the carrier-supplied container.
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Inversiones Navieras Imparco, 646 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1981) (fol-
lowed Leather's Best and Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.
1981); Note, Carrier-Owned Shipping Container Found Not to be COGSA "Package", 56
TUL. L REv. 1409 (1982).
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tainers rendered the outcome of the package issue unpredictable. In an at-
tempt to provide some certainty to the question of when a container
would be deemed to be a package, the Second Circuit, with a split decision
in Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfshif-
fahrts-Gesellschaft,75 held that a palletized group of cartons was a package
for limitation purposes. This decision favored the carrier by strictly con-
struing COGSA.76 Over a vigorous dissent, the majority opinion noted
the following factors in support of its view: (1) the parties considered each
pallet to be a package according to the dock receipt, bill of lading, and
claim letter; (2) the shipper rather than the carrier chose to place the car-
tons in a pallet and should bear the consequences; (3) the shipper had a
statutory option to declare a higher value if he wished; (4) prior judicial
construction warranted the conclusion that the pallet and its contents
were a package; and (5) reliance on prior law by shippers and carriers in
preparing their insurance needs should not be disturbed.77 The dissent
disagreed with each factor, stating that ambiguities in a bill of lading
should be construed against the carrier since the bill of lading is a contract
of adhesion. Furthermore, the dissent found that the parties' correspon-
dence described the cargo as cartons and packages, so the bill of lading no-
tation of pallets as packages should be disregarded. Both parties
benefitted from the use of pallets, making the shipper's preparation of
them insignificant. In addition, the dissenting opinion concluded that the
option to declare a higher value was irrelevant if the court held the carton
rather than the pallet to be the package. Finally, since COGSA was
designed to benefit the shipper, the dissent stated that "certainty at the ex-
pense of legislative policy and equity is undesirable and often turns out to
be ephemeral. 78
In contrast, the Second Circuit in Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormac-
lynx,79 held that the container was not a package under section 1304(5) of
COGSA because of the indication on the bill of lading that the carrier
owned the container. The term "package" was "more sensibly related to
the unit in which the shipper packed the goods" than to a large metal ob-
ject that was functionally part of the ship. 0 In Leather's Best, leather was
loaded into steel-wrapped cartons that were stowed in a carrier-supplied
container. The bill of lading recited "1 container said to contain 99 bales
of leather," 81 and was verified by the carrier. The court recognized the
75. 375 F.2d 943 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).
76. Id at 947.
77. Id at 946.
78. Id at 947-48.
79. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
80. Id at 815.
81. Id at 804. Cf. Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 357 F.
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conflicting arguments,8' and noted that the distinctions between this case
and StandardElectrica were not altogether satisfactory. 3 The court none-
theless adhered to the primary purpose of COGSA which was to set "a
reasonable figure below which the carrier should not be permitted to limit
his liability. '8 4 Left open, however, was the question of whether a
container would be a COGSA package when the bill of lading failed to
state the number of containers or when the container was owned or fur-
nished by the shipper.'5
Subsequent to the decision in Leather's Best, the Second Circuit formu-
lated the "functional economics" test in Royal Typewriter Co. v. MI V
Kulmerland.86 According to this test, the shipper's cargo unit stowed in a
container would be considered functional, and therefore a package, if the
cargo unit could have been shipped overseas in the manner in which it was
packaged by the shipper. The cartons of adding machines were not func-
tional because they were packed in the container in a manner unlike that
employed in break-bulk shipping customarily used prior to the use of con-
tainers. Consequently, the carrier's liability was limited to $500.87
The functional economics test was not consistently followed by the
courts and was criticized by the commentators.88 For example, in Matsu-
shita Electric Corp. of America v. S.S. Aegis Spirit,89 a district court in
Washington favored the approach of Leather's Best over Royal Type-
writer, and held that a carrier-furnished container was not a COGSA
package when the contents were disclosed in the bill of lading. Although
the court proposed that a container never be a COGSA package, the court
Supp. 982, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 543 F.2d 967 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939(1976) (container holding goods of a single shipper held to beapackage because the shipper
packed the container, and uniformity of result and simplicity of approach would be
achieved).
82. 451 F.2d at 815 (holding that if the container were deemed a package, uniform-
ity and predictability would be furthered and if the shipper packed the container it would
not be in the weaker position).
83. Idat 815.
84. Id
85. Id; see Simon, Latest Developments, supra note 17 (clear holding of Leather's
Best was that container was not a package).
86. 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973).
87. Id at 648-49. The court found that the units of adding machines, individually
packaged in small cardboard cartons, were not functional and therefore limited the car-
rier's liability to $500 under COGSA.
88. See, e.g., Shinko Boeki Co., L.T.D. v. S.S. "Pioneer Moon", 507 F.2d 342,345(2d Cir. 1974) (containerized bulk liquids not a package since more analogous to part of the
ship that previously used 55 gallon drums to transport liquids). The case is discussed in Si-
mon, More on the Law of Shipping Containers, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 603 (1975). In re Tug
Dorothy H., 487 F. Supp. 383,392 (W.D. Va. 1979); Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am. v. S.S.
Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. at 904. The functional economics test creates unworkable
problems of proof, encourages economic waste by causing the shipper to overprepare its
cargo to avoid the container being classified as a package, and favors the carrier who experi-
ences major savings, and emphasizes the slight benefits to the shipper of simple packaging.
Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, supra note 6, at 530-32. Cf. DeOrchis, supra note
23.
89. 414 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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did not have to go beyond the facts of the case. 0 The court stated that "[a]
test for determining whethe a container is a package must reflect the real-
ities of the maritime industry of today while remaining faithful to the ex-
press language and legislative policy embedded in the COGSA
provisions."'" The court, assuming that Congress intended the word
package to haveits plain, ordinary meaning,92 pointed out that the parties'
intent as evidenced by the bill of lading should have no effect on the
COGSA determination. If the parties were allowed to allocate liability by
defining a container as a package, the liability limitation of the statute
would have no effect. 3
In a recent case, Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc.," the Second Cir-
cuit bypassed the functional economics test and returned to the analysis
of Leather's Best,95 which focused on the disclosure in the bill of lading.96
The Mitsui court declined to follow Royal Typewriter because of its incon-
sistency with Leather's Best. According to Royal Typewriter, even if a ship-
per complied with the disclosure relied upon in Leather's Best, the
carrier's liability would be limited to $500 per container if the units within
the container were not functional. Furthermore, the Royal Typewriter de-
cision was at odds with the language and purpose of COGSA and over-
looked the possibility that goods not shipped in packages could be
deemed customary freight units within section 1304(5) of COGSA.97 The
decision in Mitsui, like the Leather's Best holding, declined to decide the
situation in which the bill of lading failed to state the number of packages
or units.98 Further refinements in the reasoning of Mitsui and Leather's
Best were undertaken by the Second Circuit in Smythgreyhound v. MI V
"Eurygenes. "
Smythgreyhound v. MI V "Eurygenes"
In Smythgreyhound v. MI V"Eurygenes,"99 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals applied Mitsui and effectively overruled Royal Typewriter. The
court commented that Mitsui and Leather's Best had appropriately re-
90. See Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, supra note 6; Comment, A
Container Should Never Be a Package: Going Beyond Mitsui v. American Export Lines,
Inc., 2 PACE L. REV. 309 (1982). For the proposition that a container should never be a
COGSA package, seesupra note 74.
91. 414 F. Supp. at 903-04.
92. I& at 907.
93. Id. at 905.
94. 636 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1981).
95. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
96. li at 818.
97. I at 818-19.
98. Id at 821 n.18; see supra note 74.
99. 666 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981). The appellate court reversed the district court deci-
sion which had been handed down prior to the Mitsui opinion.
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jected a complex intent analysis in favor of a "clear rule that where the
contents of a container are disclosed in the bill of lading then the
container is not the COGSA package.""°
The vessel M/V "Eurygenes" had loaded cargo in Japan consisting of
stereo equipment for carriage to London and Rotterdam. A fire occurred
in the North Atlantic and destroyed or damaged a substantial quantity of
the cargo.' A consent decree embodied a settlement formula as to vari-
ous suits that arose out of the fire and which had been consolidated in the
Southern District of New York. Agreement could not be reached, how-
ever, as to the appropriate definition of a package for purposes of apply-
ing the limitation on liability specified in the bills of lading.0 2
The bills of lading incorporated the terms of COGSA by reference and
specified that the bills would be construed according to the laws of the
United States.l0 3 A clause in the bills of lading provided, in language simi-
lar to section 1304(5) of COGSA, that the liability of the carrier be limited
to "$500 per package or per unit... unless the nature of the goods and a
valuation higher than $500 shall have been declared in writing by the ship-
per upon delivery to the carrier and extra freight paid if required."'" The
bills of lading recited "SHIPPER'S PACKING SEAL, SAID TO CON-
TAIN." In the column headed "[n]umber of packages," the notation "8
containers" appeared. Immediately below this, the number of cartons,
1500, was set forth in parentheses. A reference to the number of contain-
ers, specifying "8 containers only," appeared where the bill of lading
called for a description of the goods.105
The plaintiff shipper had sent three shipments of stereo equipment in
cartons that were packed in containers. Although the shipper previously
had shipped its goods without containers, the shipper chose containers on
this occasion because of problems with pilferage. The ship could carry
both containerized and break-bulk cargo. The containers were carrier-
supplied, but loaded and sealed by the shipper's freight forwarder who de-
livered them to the ship.106
100. Id. at753.
101. Id at 747.
102. Id.
103. Id
104. Id The bill of lading provided in relevant part:
This bill of lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Carriage of
Goods By Sea Act of the United States of America, approved April 16, 1936, which
shall be deemed to be incorporated herein, and nothing herein shall be deemed a
surrender by the Carrier of any of its rights, immunities or limitations or an in-
crease of any of its responsibilities or liabilities under said Act.... The bill of lad-
ing shall be construed and the rights of the parties thereunder determined
according to the law of the United States.
Id at 747 nn.1-2.
105. Id at 747; see Smythgreyhound v. M/V "Eurygenes", No. 75 Civ. 2914 (GLG)
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1980).
106. Smythgreyhound, No. 75 Civ. 2914.
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Upon referral to a magistrate, the bill of lading provision limiting car-
rier liability to $500 per package was applied to the containers. The magis-
trate concluded that the parties' intended the container, and not the
carton, to be considered the package. Using the functional economics test
of Royal Typewriter, the magistrate initially found that since the cartons
were functional and capable of being shipped without being container-
ized, a rebuttable presumption arose that the cartons should constitute
the package." 7 The magistrate looked to the parties' characterization of
the cargo, supporting documentation, and trade custom and usage" 8 to
rebut this presumption by finding evidence of the parties' intent that the
container was the package. To support this intent, the magistrate relied
upon the carrier's inability to verify the contents of the sealed containers,
the several references to containers and only one reference to cartons in
the bills of lading, and the plaintiff's preference in using containers to re-
duce theft. 9
On appeal, the District Court for the Southern District of New York re-
jected the magistrate's determination of "intent," but applied the $500
limitation to the containers because the shipper "chose for its own reasons
to obtain containers, stuff and seal them itself, and ship them pursuant to
a bill of lading that gave the carrier no ability to determine the value of the
cargo therein."'"0 After the decision of the district court, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decided Mitsui. The Mitsui opinion held that a
container supplied by a carrier is not a COGSA package if its contents and
the number of packages or units are disclosed in the bill of lading.",
Thereafter, the Second Circuit heard the appeal for Smythgreyhound and
held that the decision of the district court limiting recovery to $500 per
container should not be upheld in light of Mitsui."2 The court reversed
and remanded for the calculation of damages." 3 In its decision, the court
of appeals rejected the carrier's argument that the existence of the ship-
per's choice to containerize distinguished the case from Mitsui. The court
also declined to consider the choice to containerize a critical factor in
prior cases assertedly based on unequal bargaining power between the
shipper and the carrier." 4 According to the court, the issue of bargaining
strength had not been a ground for prior judicial determinations of the
meaning of the term "package" under the COGSA limitation of liability.
107. 666 F.2d at 747.
108. Id at747-48.
109. Id at 747-48 n.3.
110. Smythgreyhound, No. 75 Civ. at 2914; see 666 F.2d at 748; supra note 107.
Ill. 636 F.2d at 821.
112. 666 F.2d at 748.
113. Id
114. Id at 748-50.
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Rather, the concern of prior cases was with the "congressional purpose of
establishing a reasonable minimum level of liability" under COGSA.11
The court discounted the carrier's contention that the inapplicability of
COGSA exproprio vigore to the case rendered statutory policy concerns
inapplicable, although the court stated that the parties' definition of a
package would have been controlling if clearly and unambiguously set
forth in the bill of lading.116 Absent a clear definition of a package, and
given the incorporation of COGSA into the bill of lading making the bill
subject to United States law, the court decided to examine prior case law
and COGSA policy concerns, rather than to rely on a complicated analy-
sis of the parties' intent.1 7
The court rejected the assertion that nonverification of the contents of
the containers was significant because the bill of lading allowed the carrier
the opportunity to examine, measure, and value the goods upon opening
the containers. The court also suggested that having the carrier check the
loading of the goods, as in Leather's Best, would be neither difficult nor
expensive."' For the reasons expressed in Mitsui, the court declined to ac-
cept the argument that because the shipper could have protected itself by
declaring a higher value of the goods and paying a higher tariff, the pack-
age provision should not be strictly construed against the carrier."19 In
Mitsui, the court observed that the option to declare a higher valueis prac-
tically never exercised. The carrier increases freight rates when a higher
value of goods is declared to compensate for the corresponding increase in
the carrier's liability. This increase in freight rates generally is greater than
the reduction in cargo insurance premiums paid by the shipper that oc-
curs when a higher value of the goods has been declared and the carrier is
held liable.' 20
The Smythgreyhound decision rejected a complex intent analysis in de-
termining whether a container is a COGSA package when the intent of the
parties is not clear from the bill of lading and when COGSA is incorpo-
rated by reference.12 1 Although the container was carrier-supplied, the
court noted that the same result should ensue when the container is not
carrier-supplied.12 2 According to the court, when the contents of the
container are disclosed in the bill of lading and no clear definition of




118. Id at 751-52 n.15.
119. Id at 752.
120. Id at 752, quotingMitsui at 815-16 n.9.
121. 666 F.2dat753.
122. Id at 749 n.9; see Simon, Latest Developments, supra note 17, at 447.
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not to be a COGSA package. The court held: "[I]n the absence of clear and
unambiguous language indicating agreement on the definition of 'pack-
age,' then we will conclusively presume that the container is not the pack-
age where the bill of lading discloses the container's contents." 23
EVALUATION AND IMPACT OF THE Smythgreyhound DECISION
The decision in Smythgreyhound refined the Mitsui rule and removed
the question of the parties' intent when (1) COGSA is incorporated by ref-
erence, (2) the bill of lading discloses the number of cargo units, and (3)
any attempt by the parties to define a package has been deemed unclear.
Given these conditions, the Second Circuit will conclusively presume that
the container is not the COGSA package,124 which result is in conform-
ance with congressional purpose.l25
The determination of legislative intent as to a COGSA package is a
helpful analysis of the policy applicable to all cases subject to COGSA.
The inquiry into the parties' intent, however, has become overly complex
by necessarily relying upon subjective factors weighted inconsistently by
different courts.126 This type of analysis has led to uncertainty due to the
unpredictability of each outcome,127 and has produced results that are in-
consistent with the COGSA purpose of providing a minimum amount of
liability protection to shippers. 28 Furthermore, the search for the intent
of the parties is misdirected because the parties rarely "intend" any posi-
tion other than the one most favorable to their own interests and those of
their insurers. Additionally, the parties should be incapable of "in-
tending" a result contrary to the minimum liability established by section
1304(5), at least to the extent COGSA applies exproprio vigore.129
The Smythgreyhound court rejected intent as the appropriate measure
of liability. When the definition of the package is unclear, the court of ap-
peals in the Smythgreyhound decision recognized, as did the district court,
that neither party fully intends a definition of package that will result in
an unfavorable outcome. 130 The court, as in Mitsui, declined to adopt an
extensive list of intent criteria because the use of those criteria would not
avoid "the pains of litigation."'131 Rather than employ specific criteria
123. 666 F.2d at 753 n.20 (emphasis in original).
124. Thus the COGSA limitation applies to either the package or the customary
freight unit.
125. See supra note 23.
126. Compare Leather's Best, 451 F.2d 800 with StandardElectrica, 375 F.2d 943.
127. Seesupra notes 64-97 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 23.
129. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
130. 666 F.2d at 748 n.4.
131. Id. at 753. For a case utilizing a twelve criteria analysis see Complaint of Nor-
folk, Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 383,392 (E.D. Va. 1979). The multi-fac-
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when intent is not clear, the Smythgreyhound court decided in favor of a
clear rule creating a conclusive presumption that the container is not a
package as long as the number of cargo items is expressed in the bill of lad-
ing. 3 ' When the number of items is not disclosed, however, an intent
analysis may be appropriate, at least when COGSA does not apply ex
proprio vigore.133 Relevant factors will be the opportunity given to the
shipper to disclose the description of the goods, how they are packed, and
by whom.
Although Smythgreyhound concerned a bill of lading that incorporated
COGSA by reference, thejudicially created presumption also may be ap-
plicable to situations in which COGSA applies exproprio vigore, whether
or not the contents of the container are disclosed. The result in Smyth-
greyhoundwas based on statutory case law and policy because the parties'
definition of the term "package" was not clear and unambiguous. The
same law and policy presumably will govern when COGSA applies di-
rectly, so that a container will not be the package. Although the decision
did not hold that the parties never could define a container to be a COGSA
package when the statute applied exproprio vigore, thejudicial reasoning
implied as much."3
The disclosure of the contents of the container served as a factor in ana-
lyzing the parties' intent in prior cases in which COGSA was incorporated
by reference."3 5 The primary function of disclosure in Smythgreyhound,
however, was not to apprise the carrier of the nature of the cargo for pur-
poses of assessing freight rates or circumventing fraud. Certainly, for
these purposes, the carrier may insert in the bill of lading a demand for in-
formation about the cargo and thus protect itself by issuing a qualified bill
tor analysis provides "little comfort to those who seek some form of short cut to
predictability of result with regard to this [package] issue." Croft & Scully Co. v. M/V
SkulptorVuchetich, 508 F. Supp. 670,684, notedin Smythgreyhound v. M/V "Eurygenes",
666 F.2d at753 n.18.
132. 666 F.2d at 753.
133. Id at753n.19.
134. The court noted that the parties may agree between themselves that the
container will be the COGSA package, "especially in cases where COGSA does not apply
exproprio vigore." Id at 753 n.20.
135. The "intent" of the parties was a significant factor in Leather's Best and Mitsui.
According to the former, intent was evidenced by the information in the bill of lading and
the ownership of the container. 451 F.2d 814-16. The carrier owned the container and the
bill of lading's contents as noted were checked by the carrier's agent upon loading. Id at
804. Mitsui adopted similar criteria, but the information on the bill of lading which indi-
cated the number of containers and units said to be contained therein was not verified since
the carrier-owned containers were given to the shipper for packing and sealing at the ship-
per's premises and were delivered sealed to the carrier. 636 F.2d at 811-12. Where nonveri-
fied, the indicated contents on the bill of lading are not "intended" by the carrier to be
dispositive of the items in the containers, much less to be definitive of the term "package"
with reference to COGSA limitation of liability. The disclosure on the bill of lading, there-
fore, should be viewed not as a factor of intent but an element which the court may consider
determinative in and of itself of whether the container is a COGSA package. See supra
notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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of lading." 6 Intent is an inappropriate inquiry outside the policy concerns
of COGSA, so that even if the contents of the container are not disclosed
on the bill of lading to which COGSA applies ex proprio vigore, the
container should not be the package. The disclosure element has little rel-
evance to the container-as-package issue in this type of situation. The
Smythgreyhound decision has removed a judicial analysis of intent from
cases in which COGSA law applies because of an unclear definition made
by the parties and the incorporation of the statute by reference in the bill
of lading. In addition, the logic of the decision would support the same re-
sult even if the COGSA statute applied directly.
CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that the Smythgreyhound decision af-
fords protection to the shipper and provides a more predictable outcome
to litigation over the definition of a "package." The decision is helpful for
the purpose of allocating the risk at the time of contracting, and gives both
parties a measure of control over the ultimate determination of when the
container will not be considered the COGSA package. Under Smyth-
greyhound, if the shipper inserts in the bill of lading, under the definition
of "package," a reference to the number of cartons or units as well as to the
number of containers, this indication will trigger the conclusive presump-
tion that the container is not the "package" for purposes of invoking lia-
bility. The presumption requires an unclear definition of package as well
as a disclosure of the cargo contents by enumerating their number, as
stowed in the containers. The carrier, however, in preparing the bill of lad-
ing, can protect itself by asking for specific information, issuing a quali-
fied bill, or inspecting the items as disclosed on the bill of lading.
The Smythgreyhound formulation of a simplified test that focuses on
the bill of lading is similar to the recent international conventions ad-
dressing the issue of when a container is a package for the purpose of limit-
ing liability. The test leads to the conclusion that a container never can be
a COGSA package if COGSA law is applicable. The analysis of intent will
be required only in those situations in which COGSA is applicable ex
proprio vigore and the number of cargo items is not disclosed on the bill of
lading, a result in keeping with the policies of both the statute and the par-
ties' freedom to contract.
136. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. A shipper, however, who makes
such disclosure on the bill of lading should not be penalized by the refusal of a carrier to ac-
cept such information, as long as the carrier has an opportunity to check the contents.
